Decision: Tuscola Wind III v Almer Township MI

Background

On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff Tuscola Wind III, LLC, (“Tuscola”) filed a complaint naming the Almer Charter Township and that Township’s Board of Trustees as Defendants. ECF No. 1. Count One of the Complaint is the “Claim of Appeal.” Compl. at ¶¶ 100–124. Tuscola Wind’s claims arise out of Defendants’ denial of a Special Land Use Permit (“SLUP”) that would have permitted Tuscola Wind to construct the “Tuscola III Wind Energy Center” in Tuscola County, Michigan. Compl. at 6. Oral argument on the claim of appeal was held on October 5, 2017. For the following reasons, the Board of Trustee’s denial of the SLUP will be affirmed.Tuscola’s final argument regarding § 1522(C)(14) is that the Township Board’s interpretation would result in exclusionary zoning, which is prohibited by Michigan law.

Excerpt of Opinion

Tuscola argues that “[u]sing an Lmax metric would make development of commercial wind energy in the Township impossible because a single wind turbine could not be sited within at least a half-mile of a nonparticipating line.” Appellant Br. at 24–25. This conclusory argument has no merit. Under Michigan, “a zoning ordinance may not totally exclude a land use where (1) there is a demonstrated need for that land use in the township or surrounding area, (2) the use is appropriate for the location, and (3) the use is lawful.” Eveline Twp. v. H & D Trucking Co., 448 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). See also M.C.L. 125.3207. Even assuming that the Township Board’s interpretation of the ordinance completely excludes wind energy development in the Township, Tuscola cannot prevail. [12]

Tuscola has made no attempt to show that there is a “demonstrated public need” for wind turbines in Almer Township, and the Court cannot comprehend why such a need would exist. “Presumably any entrepreneur seeking to use land for a particular purpose does so because of its perception that a demand exists for that use. To equate such a self-serving demand analysis with the ‘demonstrated need’ required by the statute would render that language mere surplusage or nugatory, in contravention of usual principles of construction.” Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Clawson, 686 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). Further, “the public need must be more than mere convenience to the residents of the community.” DF Land Dev., LLC v. Charter Twp. of Ann Arbor, No. 291362, 2010 WL 2757000, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. July 13, 2010). 

Wind turbines produce energy, which is, of course, needed by the Almer Township community. But Tuscola cannot reasonably argue that the Township will have inadequate access to energy absent the wind energy project. The Michigan Court of Appeals has explained that, to Tuscola has made no attempt to show that there is a “demonstrated public need” for wind turbines in Almer Township, and the Court cannot comprehend why such a need would exist. “Presumably any entrepreneur seeking to use land for a particular purpose does so because of its perception that a demand exists for that use. To equate such a self-serving demand analysis with the ‘demonstrated need’ required by the statute would render that language mere surplusage or nugatory, in contravention of usual principles of construction.” Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Clawson, 686 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). Further, “the public need must be more than mere convenience to the residents of the community.” DF Land Dev., LLC v. Charter Twp. of Ann Arbor, No. 291362, 2010 WL 2757000, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. July 13, 2010). 

Wind turbines produce energy, which is, of course, needed by the Almer Township community. But Tuscola cannot reasonably argue that the Township will have inadequate access to energy absent the wind energy project. The Michigan Court of Appeals has explained that, to show demonstrated public need, the plaintiff must do  more than show that “residents of the  township would benefit from” the excluded use. Id. (emphasis in original). Tuscola has not carried that burden here.

C. The Township Board reasonably interpreted its Zoning Ordinance and, under that reasonable interpretation, Tuscola was undisputedly in noncompliance with the Zoning Ordinance. Because at least one of the bases on which the Board premised its denial was lawful, the remaining four bases need not be examined. The Township Board’s denial will be affirmed. 

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[12] And that assumption is questionable. Tuscola asserts that application of an Lmax standard would prevent the company from siting a turbine within 2,775 feet from a nonparticipating property line. See Dec. 22, 2016, Supp. Info. at 1. Thus, Tuscola would be forced to reach agreements with a significantly larger number of property owners in order to build the turbines as currently planned. But it seems plausible that Tuscola might be able to enter into more land use contracts with property owners and/or site a fewer number of turbines in Almer Township. Both of those alternatives would undoubtedly impact the profitability of the project, but Tuscola has not demonstrated that it is entitled to deferential or economically favorable conditions. Perhaps application of an Lmax standard creates such an economic hardship that it constitutes de facto exclusionary zoning. But Tuscola’s conclusory briefing on this point falls far short of showing that to be true.Thomas L. Ludington